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The world of agricultural commodity trading firms has changed over the years, although 
corporate concentration has long been a defining feature of this sector. The four dominant 
agricultural trading firms—the ABCDs (ADM, Bunge, Cargill and Louis-Dreyfus)—have a long 
history dating back to the 1800s and early 1900s. First established as private, family-owned grain 
merchant companies with specific geographical specialties, these firms have since evolved to be 
quite complex companies. They buy and sell grain as well as a host of other agricultural and non-
agricultural commodities, while they also undertake a range of activities from finance to 
production to processing and distribution. New entrants into this space have also taken on 
complex structures and activities in a bid to stay competitive. 
In many ways the world’s major grain trading firms now operate more like cross-sectoral 
“value chain managers” on a truly global scale compared to their grain trade origins. High 
degrees of concentration combined with control over a vast array of activities give these firms 
enormous power to shape key aspects of the global food landscape. As a result, the agricultural 
commodity-trading sector has important implications for farmer livelihoods, hunger and the 
environment. Following a brief snapshot of the main firms that dominate global grain trading 
today, I examine the major trends that have reshaped the sector in the past decade. I then outline 
the main challenges that these changes present for the food system, and suggest possible research 
directions moving forward.  
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Snapshot of the agricultural commodity trading sector 
Agricultural commodity trading firms are enormous in size, although their precise scale is hard 
to determine (Blas, 2013a). Cargill, the largest of the grain trading firms, for example, recorded 
revenues of over US$136 billion in 2013, and boasts its 142,000 strong workforce. The other 
dominant firms in the ABCD grouping, although smaller in size than Cargill, are still large 
compared to firms in other sectors: ADM – US$89 billion in revenue and 31,000 employees; 
Bunge – US$61 billion in revenue and 35,000 employees (Marketline, 2014a, b, c and d, p. 3); 
and Dreyfus – US$63.6 billion in revenue and up to 22,000 employees (Louis Dreyfus, 2014a). 
These major agricultural commodity-trading firms have operations in a number of countries 
around the world. Cargill and ADM, for example, operate globally; Bunge and Dreyfus focus on 
the Americas, Europe and Asia.  
The ABCDs form a relatively concentrated group that controls over 70 percent of the 
global grain market (Murphy, Burch, & Clapp, 2012, p. 9), although new entrants (discussed 
below) are also edging into the market in recent years. Profits on the whole for these firms 
increased in the period of commodity price volatility since 2007, but their earnings have been 
highly volatile as well (see Figure 1). The net earnings of these firms, however, have generally 
been well above levels achieved in the early 2000s. The grain trade surged by over 20 percent in 
the 2000-2010 period, compared to less than 2 percent growth in the previous decade, and 
declining nearly 1 percent in the 1980s (Blas, 2013a). 
Figure 1. Net Income of the Major Agricultural Commodity Trading firms 1995-2014 
Sources: Company websites; financial press 
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New trends shaping the world of agricultural commodity trading 
 
Three major trends in the past decade are worth noting in the agricultural commodity-trading 
sector. First, new players have arrived on the scene, and as a result are driving important changes 
in the organization of the sector. Second, agricultural commodity trading firms have intensified 
the vertical integration that was already in motion some decades earlier, in effect now becoming 
managers of entire value chains. And third, agricultural commodity trading companies have also 
intensified their horizontal integration, diversifying beyond food and agriculture into other 
sectors. These three trends are intertwined in complex ways and have wide-ranging implications 
for small-scale producers, hunger, and the environment.  
 
New players    
 
Growing demand for food and agricultural commodities from emerging and rapidly growing 
economies has brought fundamental changes to the commodity trading firms in the past decade. 
As incomes have risen in China in recent decades, there has been a steadily growing demand for 
more meat and dairy products, which has put pressure on global grain supplies as China begins 
to look abroad for supplies. Africa is also now seen as the latest growth area for commodity 
traders seeking to market their products (Blas, 2013b). It is not just demand from emerging 
economies that is changing. There has also been a huge jump in food exports from non-
traditional exporters between 2001 and 2009 (Briones & Rakotagrisoa, 2013, p. 5). In this 
context, new rival agricultural commodity firms have emerged as important players in the past 
decade and are already challenging the dominance of the ABCD companies.  
A number of significant acquisitions and mergers have taken place among several Asian 
commodity firms as they divvy up the marketplace amongst themselves, and their concentration 
in the region grows. Wilmar, for example, was first established in 1991 and has since grown to a 
significant size, with 2013 revenues of US$44 billion and 90,000 employees (Marketline, 2014h, 
p. 3). In the same year, China’s Cofco had US$32 billion in revenue and 120,000 employees 
(Roberts, 2014). Several other Asian commodity trading firms also teamed up in 2014 when 
Cofco, which is a government controlled agricultural commodity trading firm, acquired a 
majority stake in the agricultural division of Noble shortly after purchasing a 51 percent stake in 
Nidera, a Dutch grain trading firm (Roberts, 2014). This move enabled China to get closer to the 
source of potential grain imports, after it signaled a reduction in its self-sufficiency policy and is 
expected to increase corn imports over the coming years (Grant, 2014). As such, Cofco has 
expanded from mainly operating in China, to having connections in the Americas, Europe,  
and Asia. 
Other global commodity firms that have historically focused on non-agricultural 
commodities are now also edging into agriculture in order to capitalize on their knowledge of a 
range of markets that have relevance for agriculture. Glencore Xtrata, a Swiss trading firm that 
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recently diversified into agriculture alongside its more traditional business of minerals and 
energy, is absolutely massive—with 2013 revenues at US$ 232 billion and 200,000 employees 
(Marketline, 2014f, p. 3). By 2014, Glencore Xtrata had become the largest commodity trading 
company in the world (Meyer, 2013). Before merging with mining firm Xtrata, Glencore 
acquired the major Canadian grain company Viterra in 2012. Prior to its acquisition of Viterra, 
Glencore captured around 9 percent of the global grain market (Telegraph, 2011). From 2012 to 
2013, the firm’s agricultural activities increased by 43 percent and its agricultural profits reached 
US$200 million in 2013 (Glencore Xtrata, 2013). Since this expansion, Glencore now operates in 
agricultural trade throughout Europe, the Americas, and Australia. 
 
Intensified vertical and financial integration  
 
In recent decades, the commodity trading firms have deepened and consolidated their vertical 
integration that began in the 1980s. In this more recent period, the firms have moved away from 
their tendency to maintain an arm’s length distance from producers and farmland, to becoming 
more closely linked to production processes than ever before. At the same time, they have 
become much more deeply engaged in financial investment activities in the sector (Murphy  
et al., 2012). 
Rather than simply marketing agricultural commodities that farmers independently 
decided to produce, these firms have now become careful managers of entire agricultural value 
chains. The grain trading companies consider themselves to be “originators” of grain supply, and 
they have become a central focal point for management along entire commodity chains—from 
land ownership to input supply, to advice and insurance, to growing contracts, to purchasing, to 
storage, to processing and retail, as well as being active in building and maintaining storage and 
transportation infrastructure and financing all along the chain (Murphy et al., 2012). Louis 
Dreyfus, for example, advertises its presence from “farm to fork” and notes: “While on the 
surface the journey sounds simple, the reality is a complex supply chain that needs to be 
controlled precisely to secure delivery” (Louis Dreyfus, 2014b).  
Technological change and informational advances have helped to drive these firms into 
all facets of agricultural commodity chains. These firms use their advantage in securing access to 
the latest information and data on market and production conditions to take on activities that they 
previously saw as too risky (Blas, 2013a; Briones & Rakotagrisoa, 2013). They are also 
collecting their own data to maintain their information edge. Cargill, for example, recently 
launched a software service designed to help farmers with “prescriptive planting,” which 
happens to also collect huge amounts of data for the firm (Bunge, 2014). 
 
Expanded horizontal integration  
 
Recent decades have seen a greater horizontal expansion of the commodity trading firms beyond 
food into industrial and other businesses (see Marketline, 2014a-e). Agricultural commodity 
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traders have become deeply involved in energy markets, for example, both those linked to 
agriculture such as biofuels, as well as those not directly related, such as petroleum. This shift 
toward a more horizontal business model appears to be linked to the firms’ intensified 
involvement in global agricultural value chains combined with their financial dealings, which 
has increased their need to operate in unrelated markets for hedging and speculating purposes.  
In this manner, agricultural and non-agricultural markets have become interlinked in new 
ways by commodity trading firms. ADM, for example, has become a major investor in corn-
based ethanol production while Cargill has ventured more fully into the petroleum industry. Both 
Cargill and ADM are involved in plastics, paints and coatings, shipping, metals and industrial 
chemicals.1 Louis Dreyfus is engaged not just in commodity trade, but also asset management, 
real estate and forestry (Louis Dreyfus, 2014a). The broader scope of commodity trading rivals 
such as Glencore Xtrata, which only recently diversified from energy and mining into agriculture 
in a significant way, has in some respects pushed the traditional agricultural traders to 
themselves diversify into other activities in order to similarly hedge their risks across sectors. 
 
 
The costs of commodity firm dominance  
 
Commodity trading firms shape markets and the governance of those markets through a variety 
of strategies: they shape public discourses about their own role in food and agriculture issues; 
they lobby governments on policy that may affect their business; and they wield enormous 
structural power that enables them to dictate prices on one hand and to set standards on the other 
(see Clapp & Fuchs, 2009; Murphy, 2008). The dominance of these firms, even as their context 
has changed over the past decade, has important implications for the livelihoods of small-scale 
agricultural producers, hunger, and the natural environment.  
 
Livelihoods at risk  
 
Small-scale producers that specialize in crops such as coffee and cocoa are increasingly being 
brought into the service of global agricultural value chains dominated by large-scale commodity 
trading firms. At the same time, commodity-trading firms are also acquiring land in many 
developing countries, often displacing small-scale producers and contracting farmers to engage 
in large-scale industrial production crops such as soy, sugar, and oil palm (Oxfam, 2014).  
 Although commodity-trading firms advertise that they are supportive of a variety of types 
of producers, the options available to those producers, particularly small-scale farmers, are 
limited in practice, and their livelihoods are put at risk as a result (see McMichael, 2013). 
Producers have become effectively captured by the global commodity giants as the latter dictate 
prices and are the main sources of farm credit.  
                                                   
1 See the websites of the companies: cargill.com and adm.com. 
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Food insecurity  
 
There is heated debate about the financial activity of commodity trading firms and its 
relationship to the broader trend of food price volatility that has plagued global agricultural 
markets in recent years (Clapp, 2014). Food price speculation has affected world hunger as rising 
prices have put food out of the reach of the world’s poorest people (Worthy, 2011).  
The agricultural commodity trading firms claim that they are simply hedging when they 
engage in futures markets and buy and sell financial derivatives, but in practice it is nearly 
impossible to differentiate between hedging and speculating. When questioned on whether 
trading highly uncorrelated commodities constitutes speculating, a Louis Dreyfus executive said 
“I don’t consider that speculating at all. It’s what’s normally done in the norm of our business. It 
is our business. It is what we do” (quoted in Meyer, 2014). These firms profit from financial 
investments in the sector whether prices of commodities are rising or falling. But this activity can 
have an influence on prices, which in turn affects people’s access to food.  
 
Environmental degradation  
 
Distance in the food system has only expanded as agricultural production has been reorganized 
by commodity trading firms into global value chains that rest on an industrial agricultural model 
that is both driven and supported by financialization (Clapp, 2014). A number of environmental 
externalities have been associated with this process, such as a negative impact on biodiversity, 
water availability, and soil fertility, in addition to contributing to climate change (Dauvergne & 
Neville, 2010; McMichael, 2010; White, Borras, Hall, Scoones, & Wolford, 2012).  
The traditional ABCD commodity-trading firms have begun to face some pressure from 
food processing firms to address the environmental externalities associated with agricultural 
supply chains (Terazono, 2014). The websites and annual reports of the commodity-trading firms 
advertise their sustainability goals and their engagement in promoting “responsible” agricultural 
supply chains. But because the trader firms do not have brand names themselves, they have little 
incentive to ensure compliance.  
 
 
The need to go beyond voluntary approaches  
 
The dominant agricultural commodity trading firms are not particularly regulated. As a recent 
Swiss government report noted openly, “Physical commodities traders are, in principle, not 
subject to any oversight” (quoted in Blas, 2013a). Privately held firms, including Louis Dreyfus 
and Cargill, are not required to report publicly on their earnings and activities. Publicly traded 
firms are also very selective about the information they release. As a result, we know little about 
their activities, and what we do know is carefully managed.  
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The commodity trading firms work hard to give the impression that the lack of regulation 
is appropriate because their activities serve the public interest. Cargill’s 2014 annual report, for 
example, is titled “Delivering”, and stresses that the firm is delivering solutions to hunger, 
obesity, and environmental degradation. But are these firms worthy of trust in one of the most 
important industries today that has wide ranging implications for the public interest? There are 
significant costs to allowing these firms to operate on such a massive and concentrated scale with 
virtually no oversight. 
 It is important to go beyond voluntary corporate social responsibility in addressing the 
impacts of the highly concentrated agricultural commodity trading firms. Future research should 
explore the following types of questions: 
 
• What are the prospects for regulation of commodity market speculation by trader firms? 
Commodity trading firms have been actively seeking to weaken financial rules around 
commodity trading (Meyer, 2014b). Whether hedging or speculating, financial bets are 
driven by the profit motive, rather than by the right to food, the need to secure livelihoods, or 
protection of the environment. Regulations that tame speculative investments in the sector 
can help to reduce price volatility and its associated impacts, and create a more supportive 
environment for the scaling up of alternative food system models. Yet to date progress on 
this front has been slow and piecemeal. 
 
• How might a reduction in corporate concentration in the agricultural commodity-trading 
sector best be achieved? Banks are retreating from their foray into commodities trading in 
the face of growing regulation following the financial crisis, but commodity trading houses 
are getting bigger because they are buying up banks’ assets and they are not as heavily 
regulated (Hume, 2014). This trend raises the question of whether regulators see these firms 
as “too big to fail” because they are systemically important (Blas, 2013a). How likely is it 
that governments will break up corporate concentration by regulating mergers and 
acquisitions through anti-trust legislation? Will these firms continue to escape oversight 
because of their sheer size and importance?  
 
• How can transparency and accountability be increased in this sector? Commodity trading 
firms may be privately owned, but they control huge segments of the global food industry 
and their activities have enormous implications for food security, livelihoods, and 
sustainability. Requiring more detailed reporting on their activities would enable more 
independent assessment of whether the activities of these firms serve the public’s interest.  
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